Governance & compliance

Audit-log key rotation

Would let an operator replace the key that signs the audit chain without breaking verification of older entries.

RoadmapEngine edition 5f8ea3af

What it does

The mechanism exists inside the audit log, but no route or command exposes it, so operators cannot rotate the audit key in this release. The log can verify a chain that spans several key epochs, and the mechanism is exercised by tests in the engine repository.

How it works

Every new entry records the key epoch that signed it, and the epoch is part of the signed bytes. Rotating from epoch n to n+1 appends a boundary entry signed by the new key whose previous hash is the old head, so the new key commits the whole earlier chain. Retired epochs stay in a table of keys that can verify but cannot sign. Verification refuses a chain whose epochs run backwards, whose boundary was removed, or whose entries name an unknown epoch. A replica seals its own chain across a rotation that its primary made.

The rotation steps (install a pending epoch, promote it, retire the old one) are implemented in the audit log and adapted to the generic rotation state machine, but no HTTP route, command or start-up path in the server calls them. Treat the audit key as fixed for the life of the log.

Limits

  • Not reachable by operators in this release.
  • The key is supplied by KYNETRA_AUDIT_HMAC_KEY or stored in the engine, and is replaced by neither route nor command today.

Evidence

  • On this siteAvailable now: the audit log
  • Tests10 rotation-adapter tests and 21 replica-chain rotation tests exist in the engine repository; they exercise the library, not an operator command

Test coverage is listed as present in the engine repository at this edition. This page does not report test results.

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